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THE OBLIGATION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION: PUBLIC AND/OR PRIVATE
CONTRACTS
Robert L. Clinton*
It is now common to think that at the Philadelphia Convention
in 1787, when the Founders adopted the clause prohibiting states
from passing laws "impairing the obligation of contracts," 1 the Foun-
ders intended the prohibition to extend only to contracts between pri-
vate individuals, and not to contracts between individuals and states.
In other words, the Founders did not intend for the prohibition to
extend to "public" contracts.2 Yet this was not the understanding of
the Marshall Court in the formative years of the Republic when the
legal community first brought the meaning of the clause into question.
Nor was it the understanding of the early writers on the Constitution,
whom the community called upon to expound the instrument not
amid the heated atmosphere of a courtroom squabble, but in rather
more academic settings.
As Wallace Mendelson recently pointed out, the widespread ac-
ceptance of the modem view of the obligation clause is probably due
largely to the influence of Benjamin Wright's The Contract Clause of
the Constitution, published in 1938 on the heels of Franklin
Roosevelt's court-packing scheme. Mendelson further suggests that
the "public-private" dichotomy sprang from "Progressive 'muck-rak-
ing' of the Constitutional Convention roughly a century after the
fact."'4
It might have appeared, in the wake of the Supreme Court's vir-
tual emasculation of the obligation clause in the 1930's, that its range
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Illinois University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
2. See JOHN MARSHALL: MAJOR OPINIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS 119-21, 132-34 (J.
Roche ed. 1967). See also G. GARVEY, CONSTITUTIONAL BRICOLAGE 76 (1971).
3. Mendelson, B.F. Wright on the Contract Clause: A Progressive Misreading ofthe Mar-
shall-Taney Era, 38 W. POL. Q., 262 (1985); B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1938).
4. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 262. For an argument against Professor Mendelson's
view of the origin of the "public-private" distinction, and a rejoinder by Mendelson, see
Melone, Mendelson v. Wright: Understanding the Contract Clause, 41 W. POL. Q. 791 (1988);
Mendelson, Bootstraps v. Evidence: A Response to Professor Melone, 41 W. POL. Q. 801 (1988).
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of application was of merely historical interest.5 Yet one prominent
author recently laid the blame for that very emasculation at John
Marshall's doorstep,6 and another complained that Marshall's "eleva-
tion" of public contracts to a constitutional status of equality with
private ones has led to a dual standard of review under the obligation
clause which "promises not only to 'impair commercial intercourse,
and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the peo-
ple, and destroy the sanctity of private faith'."7
Whatever one thinks of these observations, it seems clear-at
least from the perspective of stare decisis-that something must have
gone badly wrong in the historical development of the contract clause.
It is my contention, however, that the problem lies not in the history,
but in the historiography. The "public-private" distinction, as we
presently understand it, is traceable not to John Marshall, but to a
group of relatively obscure legal writers in the 1870's. Their work
constitutes the beginning of a major transformation in academic ori-
entation to the Supreme Court, a transformation which did not reach
its culmination until some forty years later. Before reaching the
1870's, it is necessary to conduct a brief historical survey.
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE IN THE FOUNDING PERIOD
There was very little discussion of the contract clause at the Phil-
adelphia Convention of 1787, and equally little at the various state
ratifying conventions which followed in the ensuing months. Rufus
King introduced the original motion at Philadelphia on August 28, in
terms virtually identical to those in Article II of the Northwest Ordi-
nance, passed by the Confederation Congress earlier in the same year,
evidently upon prodding of "land speculators in and out of Congress
5. See Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
6. Palmer, Obligations of Contracts: Intent and Distortion, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
631 (1987). Palmer argues provocatively that Marshall's protection of state land grants
against impairment in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), necessarily led to the
recognition of reserved state powers, which then had to be "balanced" against private rights in
a succession of nineteenth-century cases. The State police power finally overcame private right
completely in Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), when the Supreme Court upheld a state debtor-
relief law, arguably the very kind of law specifically intended by the Founders to be precluded
by the contract clause.
7. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation of the Constitu-
tional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. 597, 630 (1987) (quoting Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213, 355 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting)). The "dual" standard refers to the
Court's recent announcement in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), that
impairment of public obligations would be "subject to more searching judicial review than
impairments of private contracts." Merrill, supra at 598-99. Merrill believes that such a decla-
ration essentially stands Article 1, § 10 on its head.
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who wished to make the western areas attractive to prospective set-
tlers."'8 The clause in the Ordinance read as follows:
[I]n the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood
and declared, that no'law ought ever to be made or have force in
the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere
with or affect private contracts, or engagements, bona fide, and
without fraud previously formed.'
After a brief discussion, during which members of the Conven-
tion raised several objections to King's motion, James Wilson argued
that the "answer to these objections is that retrospective interferences
only are to be prohibited."" ° Madison then followed with the opinion
that retrospective interferences with contracts would be taken care of
by the provision prohibiting ex post facto laws, which he apparently
thought covered both civil and criminal cases. I Madison's view was
not challenged, so Rutledge then moved to replace King's original
motion with one prohibiting retrospective laws, and the new motion
passed without further discussion. 2 However, Madison had been
wrong about the identity of "retrospective" and ex post facto, for
Dickinson announced on the following day that ex post facto referred
to criminal cases only (after searching Blackstone's Commentaries the
previous evening). About two weeks later Mr. Gerry moved to extend
the provision to civil cases, but his motion failed.
13
The final development in the Convention occurred on September
12 when the Committee on Style presented its report, having changed
the wording of the clause to read that no state shall pass laws "alter-
ing or impairing the obligation of contracts."' 4 Two days later the
Convention dropped the word "altering" without discussion, leaving
the clause in its present form.' 5 We may conclude from this brief
review that the proceedings at Philadelphia offer no basis for believing
that the Founders intended to make a sharp distinction between pub-
8. C. SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER 243 (1956).
9. THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE UNION OF THE SEV-
ERAL STATES 292 n.7 (W. Solberg ed. 1958).




14. B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1938). Interest-
ingly, neither Merrill nor Palmer comment on the deletion of the word "private" from the final
draft of the clause. They appear to have assumed that the Founders so thoroughly accepted
the "private contract" interpretation of the provision that there was simply no need to place




lic and private contracts. In fact, the record appears to indicate the
opposite, since the word "private" in King's initial motion was subse-
quently deleted from the clause.
With respect to subsequent discussions in the various state ratify-
ing conventions and in the Federalist, the record is equally scanty.
The only straightforward discussion of the clause in the Federalist is
that by Madison in number forty-four, in which he says that "laws
impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first princi-
ples of the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation
.... Very properly, therefore, have the Convention added this consti-
tutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights."' 6
This tells us very little, since, except in the very special case of con-
tracts between governmental units, the "rights" affected by state im-
pairment of public contracts are always private ones. The only other
reference to contracts in the Federalist is Hamilton's in number seven,
in which he specifically mentions "private contracts." He did this not
while discussing the contract clause but, rather, while discussing the
monetary clauses in general.17
There are only two relevant discussions of the clause in state rati-
fying conventions, one favorable to each interpretation. In Virginia,
Patrick Henry argued that the clause "includes public contracts, as
well as private contracts between individuals."' 8 The answer came
from Governor Randolph, who stated that he was "still a warm friend
of the prohibition, because it must be promotive of virtue and justice,
and preventive of injustice and fraud."1 9 Although Randolph subse-
quently points to state interferences with private contracts as a source
of great calamities, he nowhere denies Henry's contention as to the
meaning of the clause.20
The other mention of the clause in a state ratifying convention
occurred in North Carolina. Here, members of the convention raised
the question as to whether the clause had reference to contracts of the
states. W.R. Davie, a member of the Federal Convention, answered
that it did not. 21 So far as I know, Davie's statement is the only defi-
nite reference in this period by a member of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion which took this position as to the intentions of the men there.
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 at 301 (J. Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed. 1961).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 7 at 42 (A. Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed. 1961).
18. W. HUNTING, THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 112 (1919).
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The only other reference which might be cited is Luther Martin's ad-
dress to the Maryland Legislature in which he explained that he voted
against the adoption of the clause because he wanted the states to
have the power to pass debtor's relief legislation in extreme circum-
stances and he thought the clause would prevent that.22 However,
Martin nowhere mentions "state" contracts in the course of his
address.
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE IN THE EARLY SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court had little occasion to interpret
the contract clause prior to the year 1810. In that year, the Court
decided the important case of Fletcher v. Peck.23 In the majority opin-
ion of the Court, John Marshall held that a state legislature's grant of
land to an individual, having been completed in the form of a convey-
ance by the governor, was a contract within the meaning of the obli-
gation clause and that a subsequent statute repealing the grant was
therefore unconstitutional. 24 Two crucial principles were established
here: (1) that a grant, completed by a conveyance (an "executed"
contract), gives rise to an implied "executory" (not completed) con-
tract on the part of the grantor to refrain from reasserting his right to
the thing granted; and (2) that a contract between a state and an indi-
vidual is a contract within the meaning of the Constitution. At the
bottom of the latter holding is the idea that there is no distinction
between "public" and "private" contracts. As to the first principle,
we shall have occasion to return later.
Between 1810 and 1823, the United States Supreme Court
handed down several important interpretations of the contract clause,
all of which expanded the Fletcher doctrine to some extent. In New
Jersey v. Wilson25 the Court held that a state's grant of immunity
from taxation was a contract within the meaning of the obligation
clause. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward the Court held
that a charter of incorporation was a contract within the meaning of
the clause, thereby extending Fletcher's protection of the contract
rights of "natural" persons to "artificial" ones as well.2 6 Finally, in
Green v. Biddle the Court protected a contract between two states
from impairment.27
22. Id. at 114.
23. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
24. Id.
25. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
27. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
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In juxtaposition to the cases involving "public" contracts, were,
of course, some cases involving "private" ones. In Sturges v. Crownin-
shield the Court held that a state bankruptcy law was unconstitu-
tional with respect to contracts made prior to its enactment,28 and in
McMillan v. McNeill the Court did the same with respect to contracts
made subsequent to a state's insolvency law,29 a principle which the
Court overruled in Ogden v. Saunders over Marshall's dissent.3"
It should be said here that there were few objections from the
bench to the Marshall Court's early interpretations of the obligation
clause in its relation to public contracts. Justice Johnson dissented
from the Court's reasoning but not from its decision in Fletcher, stat-
ing that, while he had no problem declaring that a state could not
revoke its grants, he would do it "on a general principle, on the reason
and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on the
Deity."'" In other words, Johnson thought that the Constitution in-
corporated natural law and evidently felt that invocation of "general
principles" would better insure the security of contracts, whether
public or private, than would resort to a clause which contained
words of "equivocal signification."32
Early decisions of the Marshall Court holding that the clause
protected public contracts as well as private ones are not altogether
without precedent. Although the Court did not base its decisions in
Fletcher, Wilson, and Dartmouth directly on these grounds, there are
"several early cases in the Federal circuit courts and at least one of
importance in the state courts which throw light upon the attitude of
the bench toward the contract clause long before Marshall was given
the opportunity in Fletcher v. Peck to express his interpretation of that
part of the Constitution."3 For example, in Vanhorne's Lessee v.
Dorrance,34 Justice Paterson, an influential member of the Federal
Convention, speaking for the circuit court held that a Pennsylvania
statute repealing a previous act confirming the title of some claimants
to land in that state was invalid as violative of the obligation clause.
The similarity of this ruling to Marshall's in Fletcher is obvious.
Another circuit court case decided in 1799, of which there is evi-
dently no official record, invalidated a Vermont law authorizing town
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819).
30. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
31. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810).
32. Id. at 144.
33. B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 18-19.
34. 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 304 (1795).
[Vol. 11:343
OBLIGATION CLAUSE
selectmen to seize church lands; and the court did so on contract
clause grounds.35 Some similarity with Dartmouth is apparent here.
In Wales v. Stetson,36 a case not decided on contract clause grounds,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court said that "rights legally vested in a
corporation cannot be controlled or destroyed by a subsequent stat-
ute, unless a power be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorpo-
ration."' 3v It is interesting that Benjamin Wright, clearly an opponent
of Marshall's early contract clause decisions, cannot find a single early
case in the state or lower federal courts which would support his posi-
tion. All of the cases which he cites in this era would have supported
Marshall's position, had Marshall chosen to use them.38
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE IN THE LATE MARSHALL
AND TANEY ERAS
If the years between the drafting of the United States Constitu-
tion and 1827 represented a period of broadening application of con-
tract clause doctrine with respect to public contracts, the period
extending from 1827 to the Civil War was a period where its applica-
bility was, to some extent, narrowed. Ogden v. Saunders, decided in
1827, has already been mentioned, but it did not involve a state con-
tract.39 Beginning in 1829, before the end of the Marshall era, the
Court began to confine the operation of the clause within the limits of
the developing doctrine of reserved state powers: police, taxation, and
eminent domain.
The first case worthy of mention is Willson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh Co." Although not itself a contract clause case, Marshall's
opinion upholding a state-authorized swamp drainage scheme fore-
shadows the subsequent development of the state "police power" doc-
trine, much later articulated in Stone v. Mississippi.41 This doctrine
ultimately was to become the chief constraint upon the operation of
the contract clause. The process finally culminated in the famous
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case of the depression era.42 In
Providence Bank v. Billings,43 the Court (per Marshall) held that a
35. B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 20.
36. 2 Mass. 143 (1806).
37. Quoted in B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 20-21 (discussing Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass.
143 (1806)).
38. See id. at 18-22.
39. See supra text accompanying note 30.
40. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
41. 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
42. Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
43. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).
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state's relinquishment of the power of taxation over a corporation is
never to be implied, since a corporate charter merely gives "individu-
ality" to a group, and "[a]ny privileges which may exempt it from the
burthens common to individuals, do not flow necessarily from the
charter, but must be expressed in it, or they do not exist."'
In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,45 Chief Justice Taney's
first important contract clause decision, the Court applied the princi-
ple enunciated in Providence to cover state grants of monopolistic
privileges, saying that public grants are to be strictly construed, with
nothing passing by implication.46 Finally, in West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix,4 7 the Court held that all contracts are made subject to the state's
power of eminent domain.
There are many other important contract cases during this pe-
riod, but the main lines of development in early-nineteenth century
law respecting state contractual obligations are suggested in those
cases mentioned above. The point of crucial importance for this in-
quiry is that, far from being neglectful of the necessity for states to
possess adequate powers to govern, as some of his latter-day detrac-
tors have suggested, John Marshall himself laid the foundation for the
subsequent development of the doctrine of reserved power. In none of
the pre-Civil War cases which imparted broader scope to these pow-
ers was the notion of the applicability of the obligation clause to pub-
lic contracts seriously questioned.48
The same may be said of treatises written by legal scholars on
both constitutional law and contract law in the period extending from
1820 to 1870. I have been unable to find a single statement during
this period directly challenging Marshall's assertion of the Framers'
intention to include public contracts within the scope of the obligation
clause. In general, the evaluations of the early contract clause deci-
sions are positive, though some of these writers do not take a clear-cut
position on the question of the intentions of the Founders with respect
to public contracts.
For example, John Taylor suggested in 1820 that the contract
clause, along with those clauses prohibiting bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws, were introduced to prevent "usurpations" and "evils,"
44. See id. at 562.
45. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
46. See id. at 544.
47. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
48. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, Ch. 3.
[Vol. 11:343
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without saying exactly what these were.49 Theron Metcalf, in 1828,
claimed that the Framers intended to prevent not only the recurrence
of evils already endured (those that had come about as a result of the
Revolutionary War, most of which evidently had to do with a
shortage of capital), but "also to guard against the happening of simi-
lar evils; 'to establish justice,' and the most perfect faith in agree-
ments, and to ensure the sanctity of private property, so far as these
objects can be secured by legislative enactments."5  Peter Du
Ponceau, in 1834, suggested an even broader reading of the clause,
holding that it was intended to apply to all contracts "absolutely and
unconditionally." 5
Chancellor Kent is seemingly in full agreement with the early
Court's view of the contract clause. He summed up his discussion of
the Dartmouth decision in 1826:
The decision in that case did more than any other single act, pro-
ceeding from the authority of the United States, to throw an im-
pregnable barrier around all rights and franchises derived from the
grant of government; and to give solidity and inviolability to the
literary, charitable, religious, and commercial institutions of our
country.52
In fact, Kent not only thought that public contracts properly fell
within the meaning of the clause but also that the principle of strict
construction of state grants, announced in the Charles River Bridge
case, was "deeply to be regretted."53
Joseph Story, while speaking of the Dartmouth College case, said
that the preservation of corporate rights may not have been directly
within the contemplation of the Framers and that they might have
had in mind more "pressing" mischiefs.5 4 He then went on to say
that the prohibition itself was more general:
It is applicable to all contracts, and not confined to the forms then
most known, and most divided. Although a rare or peculiar case
may not of itself be of sufficient magnitude to induce the establish-
ment of a constitutional rule; yet it must be governed by that rule,
49. J. TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 73-74
(1820).
50. T. METCALF, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 318 (1828 & reprint 1868).
51. P. DUPONCEAU, A BRIEF VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 43
(1834).
52. 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 418 (6th ed. 1840).
53. 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 459 (6th ed. 1840).




when established, unless some plain and strong reason for exclud-
ing it can be given. It is not sufficient to show, that it may not have
been foreseen, or intentionally provided for. To exclude it, it is
fecessary to go further, and show, that if the case had been sug-
gested, the language of the convention would have been varied so,
as to exclude and except it. 5
In addition to the foregoing early references, there are the follow-
ing later ones: Francis Hilliard, in 1848, said that the obligation
clause "received from the Supreme Court its fullest and most satisfac-
tory exposition, in vindicating the charter of Dartmouth College from
legislative interference and assumption."56 Timothy Walker dis-
cussed the contract clause extensively, along with its basis in the
Northwest Ordinance, and spoke as if there was never any doubt
about its application to state contracts. 7 William Duer, in 1856,
thought that the Framers intended an even broader scope for the
clause than that given to it by the Marshall Court.58
The only writers in this period whose statements can be inter-
preted as doubting that the Framers intended inclusion of public con-
tracts within the scope of the obligation clause are Theophilus
Parsons (1855),' 9 George Ticknor Curtis (1858), ° and Thomas M.
Cooley (1868);61 and the case is weak in each instance. Parsons sim-
ply says that the Framers' intent is not certain on this point, but he
goes on to say that whatever their motives, it is nevertheless quite
settled that no distinction between public and private contracts exists,
so far as the Constitution is concerned.
62
Curtis claims that the contract clause in the Northwest Ordi-
nance is more "stringent" than that in the Constitution,63 which some
have interpreted as a denial that the Founders intended state con-
tracts to be covered by the clause. 6' However, there is a more
straightforward interpretation available, since the Framers substituted
the term "impairing" (in the Constitution) for the words "in any
55. Id.
56. F. HILLIARD, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW 44 (1848).
57. T. WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW 200 (1869).
58. W. DUER, CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 347 (1856).
59. 2 T. PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1855).
60. 2 G. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1858).
61. T. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
62. T. PARSONS, supra note 59, at 530.
63. G. CURTIS, supra note 60, at 366.
64. See, e.g., Hill, The Dartmouth College Case, 8 AMER. L. REV. 189, 196 (1874).
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manner whatever, interfere with or affect" (in the Ordinance). 65
Clearly, the latter phrase is much more "stringent" than the former;
yet, in the Ordinance, this more stringent phrase is applied only to
private contracts, not to public ones. Because the Founders likewise
specifically deleted the word "private" from the original clause, as we
have seen, it is not unreasonable to assume that Curtis meant nothing
more than this.
Cooley doesn't address the question of the Founders' intentions
specifically. In discussing Fletcher, he says only that the decision in
that case settled the crucial points that executed contracts are within
the operation of the clause and that a state's contract with an individ-
ual is within it also.6 6 He seemed to have no problem with the inclu-
sion of public contracts in the clause in 1868; but, in a short treatise
first published some twelve years later, he says, referring to the period
of the constitutional convention, that "[a]pparently nothing was in
view at the time except to prevent the repudiation of debts and private
obligations, and the disgrace, disorders, and calamities that might be
expected to follow." ' 67 Now, one can read this statement as saying the
same as that of Story, quoted before: that what was "in view" is not
necessarily what was "intended. ' 68 Yet the absence of the remark in
the earlier treatise is nonetheless interesting, especially in view of the
apparent shift in attitudes toward the contract clause that took place
in the period between them. To this subject we shall now turn.
THE SHIFr
As we have seen, examination of prominent legal treatises writ-
ten prior to the Civil War produced no clear-cut challenge to the
Marshall Court's early view that the obligation clause bound the
states to performance of their contracts. Apparently, state and lower
federal courts in the pre-Fletcher era adopted this theory as well. But
after the Civil War-Reconstruction period this view was brought into
question. The first definitive statement in a major legal treatise, to the
effect that the Framers intended the clause to apply only to "private
debts and obligations," is evidently that of Cooley in 1880, mentioned
above. One may find numerous such statements in treatises, articles,
65. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
66. T. COOLEY, supra note 61, at 275.
67. T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 328 (3rd ed. 1898).
68. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
1988-89]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
textbooks, and judicial opinions published after 1880, as we shall soon
see.
Between 1874 and 1879 a number of articles appeared in the
American and Southern Law Reviews, all of which were highly critical
of the Marshall Court's early contract clause decisions. Clement H.
Hill, Assistant Attorney-General of the United States in the Grant
administration, published the first of these in 1874 in the American
Law Review.69 R. Hutchinson published the second critical article in
the Southern Law Review in 1875, 70 and the Southern Law Review
published the rest in a series of articles between 1875 and 1879, writ-
ten by John M. Shirley.71 Shirley published all of his articles, with
some additional materials, in book form in 1879.72 These works,
taken together, embody a literal plethora of arguments designed to
show that Marshall's early contract decisions (especially Fletcher,
Wilson, and Dartmouth) misinterpreted the Constitution from several
standpoints. Since each of these works contains most of the negative
judgments (especially Hill's and Shirley's), one can consider these
works taken together as constituting the turning point in the scholarly
interpretation of the obligation clause in nineteenth-century law.
Without going into all the details, I shall try to state briefly the vari-
ous lines of argument found in them.
The first type of argument against Marshall's early view (found
in both Hill and Shirley) revolves about the assertion that James Wil-
son was the real author of the obligation clause. The basic idea is
that, since Wilson was the only Founder thoroughly conversant with
the civil law tradition, and since the phrase "obligation of contract"
apparently had its linguistic origin in the Latin obligatio ex contractu,
widely used in Roman law, it follows that Wilson must have authored
the clause and, furthermore, must have intended the adoption of the
civil law meaning of the phrase, which, in early Roman law, referred
only to "private debts and obligations."73 In support of this view,
both Hill and Shirley refer to the argument of Mr. Hunter, counsel in
Sturges v. Crowninshield, which is the first instance I know of where
someone actually urged the view upon the Court. Marshall and his
69. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
70. Hutchinson, Laws Impairing the Obligation of Contracts, 1 S.L. REV. 401 (1875).
71. 2 S.L. REV. (pts. 1-4) 22, 247, 500, 661 (1876); 3 S.L. REV. (pts. 5 & 6) 62, 185 (1877);
4 S.L. REV. 857 (1878). See also 5 S.L. REV. 879 (1880), for confirmation of Shirley's author-
ship of the articles listed above.
72. J. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES (1879).
73. Hill, supra note 64, at 196-97.
354 [Vol. 11:343
OBLIGATION CLAUSE
colleagues evidently rejected the argument.74
The second line of argument concerns an implication of the civil-
law obligation. Since in civil law there are only "contracts" and
"quasi-contracts," since no "real" obligation arises from a quasi-con-
tract, and since in civil law "implied" contracts are merely a species
of quasi-contract, it follows that no real obligation can arise from a
contract merely implied. This means, of course, that the implied ex-
ecutory contract which Marshall held to have arisen out of the
Fletcher land grant was really no contract at all, and therefore it
should not have been protected by the Constitution even if state con-
tracts were within the scope of the clause.75 In other words, accord-
ing to this view, any additional obligation which arises from an
executed contract must itself be by express covenant and cannot be
implied. As concerns the subject of public contracts, the gist of this
argument seems to be that, if Marshall had not made a mistake on
this fundamental point (executed contracts), then he would not have
been able to set the precedent with respect to state contracts for which
Fletcher became justly famous, and which served as the major
groundwork of the Dartmouth College decision: the decision which
both Hill and Shirley are most interested in attacking.
The third type of argument produced in the attack on Marshall's
view concerns the source of the distinction between public and private
contracts. Both Hill and Shirley hold that this distinction is based not
upon the origin of the contract but rather upon the objects for which
it was created. This was the view expressed by Mr. Sullivan (counsel
for Woodward) in his argument before the New Hampshire Supreme
Court at Exeter, a view which Chief Justice Richardson accepted in
his majority opinion there and which Marshall's Dartmouth opinion
later overruled.76 According to this theory, if a state grants a charter
of incorporation (or a land grant, perhaps) for the accomplishment of
important public purposes, then it is a "public" contract, and if one
accepts the Hill-Shirley view, this "public" contract is not protected
by the obligation clause. Conversely, if there are no significant "pub-
lic" purposes involved, then it is a merely "private" contract, even if a
state is one of the parties. Hill makes the latter point in his discussion
of Fletcher, the land grant in which he argues might at least plausibly
be construed a "private" contract in this sense; though it seems quite
evident to him (and to Shirley) that the Dartmouth charter cannot be
74. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 151 (1819).
75. Hill, supra note 64, at 198.




Related to the "object-origin" argument, Marshall's critics pro-
duced a fourth type of argument: whatever constitutes the obligation
of a contract, it is a creature of positive law, and it is therefore an
absurdity to hold that a state (which, after a fashion, creates all con-
tracts, since all contracts are made subject to its laws) can be obli-
gated by its own contracts. This would be somewhat like saying that
God is obligated by the Ten Commandments. The view at least im-
plies that a state cannot contract with respect to objects within its
essential (sovereign) powers, and it would seem especially to bring
into question Marshall's holding in New Jersey v. Wilson, that a state
may grant perpetual tax exemptions.78 The real point of this argu-
ment seems to be that Marshall must have, in fact, based his early
contract decisions upon natural law, rather than positive law and that
the men at the Philadelphia Convention could have never intended
such a basis for judicial decisions. For empirical evidence in support
of this position, Marshall's critics often refer to his famous statement
in the Fletcher opinion to the effect that "the State of Georgia was
restrained, either by general principles which are common to our free
institutions, or by the particular provisions of the Constitution of the
United States."
79
Hutchinson put forward a fifth argument which this Article will
consider: that the Founders (or perhaps those in the various state
ratifying conventions) could not possibly have intended both (1) that
the obligation clause would have the effect of binding the states to
perform their contracts, and (2) that the federal courts would possess
the jurisdiction over state courts that Marshall held the former to
have, according to the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of
1789, in Cohens v. Virginia.0 The idea here seems to be that the
Founders could not reasonably have expected the states to be willing
to surrender so much power to the national government in general,
and to the federal courts in particular. In other words, from the
states' point of view, one might concede either Fletcher or Cohens, but
not both.
Finally, Shirley adduces a rather large and complex set of histori-
cal-biographical arguments against Marhsall's Dartmouth College rul-
ing, most of which are hardly worthy of consideration. Here is a
77. Hill, supra note 64, at 193.
78. See supra text accompanying note 25.
79. J. SHIRLEY, supra note 72, at 403.
80. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); see Hutchinson, supra note 70, at 401.
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sample of these arguments: (1) that the King never really granted the
Dartmouth charter-rather, the royal governor granted it without the
King's knowledge;8' (2) that Webster and Mason (counsel for the col-
lege) never really had much faith in the obligation clause argument,
anyway-shown by the fact that only about one-tenth of Webster's
argument before the Court was devoted to it;8 2 (3) that the
Dartmouth dispute was really not a "legal" dispute at all-but rather
a political dispute between Federalists and Antifederalists (or a reli-
gious dispute between Calvinists and non-Calvinists), resulting in a
perversion of the Constitution in favor of the "Federalist" notion of
the sanctity of private property. 3
Here, then, are the major arguments expressed by the trilogy of
critics. It seems clear that their real concern is not with the substance
of the Marshall Court's early contract clause decisions but rather with
the consequences of these decisions in terms of later legal, political,
and economic developments in the nineteenth century. 4 Whatever
one thinks about such consequences, before deciding to hold the Mar-
shall Court responsible for all of them, one should evaluate the argu-
ments on their own merits.
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST MARSHALL'S CRITICS
First, no real evidence exists of Judge Wilson's alleged author-
ship of the clause. Neither Hill nor Shirley nor Hutchinson cite any
source other than "tradition" in support of this view, and it seems
implausible since Wilson was not a member of the Committee on
Style at the Philadelphia Convention from which the clause, in its
final form, emerged. 5 Coupled with this, Rufus King, who intro-
duced the clause in the original form of the Northwest Ordinance,
was a member of this Committee. 6 Curtis, in fact, seems to have
thought that King's authorship of the clause was unquestioned. 7
Nor is it clear what the proponents of this view would have
proven if they showed that Wilson authored the clause. Although
Wilson had no opportunity while on the Bench to construe the clause
directly (a fact which both Shirley and Hill bemoan), a passage from
81. J. SHIRLEY, supra note 72, at 52-53.
82. Id. at 208.
83. Id. at 79.
84. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 64, at 192.
85. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 11.
86. Id.
87. 1 G. CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 548 (1897).
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his Works seems to show a marked affinity for the kind of view later
expressed by Marshall. Speaking of the state, Wilson says:
It is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its interests; it has its
rules; it has its obligations; it has its rights. It may acquire prop-
erty, distinct from that of its members; it may incur debts, to be
discharged out of the public stock, not out of the private fortunes
of individuals: it may be bound by contracts and for damages aris-
ing quasi ex contractu.88
And in arguing against repeal of the Charter of the Bank of North
America in 1785, he says:
I am far from opposing the legislative authority of the state: but it
must be observed, that, according to the practice of the legislature,
publick acts of very different kinds are drawn and promulgated
under the same form ... surely it will not be pretended, that, after
laws of those different kinds are passed, the legislature possesses
over each the same discretionary power of repeal. In a law respect-
ing the rights and properties of all the citizens of the state, this
power may be safely exercised by the legislature .... Very differ-
ent is the case with regard to a law, by which the state grants privi-
leges to a congregation or other society .... Still more different is
the case with regard to a law, by which an estate is vested or con-
firmed in an individual: if, in this case, the legislature may, at dis-
cretion, and without any reason assigned, divest or destroy his
estate, then a person seized of an estate in fee simple, under legisla-
tive sanction is, in truth, nothing more than a solemn tenant at
will. 9
It should also be said that Wilson himself was a product of the
Scotch-Moralist school of philosophy and, following this tradition,
held a profound belief in natural law, which recognized no distinction
between obligations arising out of public, as contrasted with private,
contracts.90 This would certainly explain the statements quoted
above, and it is therefore unclear, all things considered, why Mar-
shall's critics think that they are gaining anything by claiming that
Wilson authored the contract clause, even if he was familiar with the
civil law. Perhaps Hill, Shirley, and others can cite Wilson's civil-law
training while ignoring his natural law background only because vir-
tually everyone in the late-eighteenth century shared the latter belief.
Many scholarly works devoted to understanding the moral basis of
88. Quoted in W. HUNTING, supra note 18, at 47.
89. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 833-34 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
90. See C. SMITH, supra note 8, Ch. 22.
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early American law have pointed this out.9'
One can find the most definitive rebuttal of the Hill-Shirley-
Hutchinson view of the implications of Wilson's alleged authorship of
the clause, however, in Wilson's concurring opinion in Chisholm v.
Georgia.92 Though the Court did not directly address the obligation
clause in that case, Wilson, buttressing his argument, refers to it any-
way: "What good purpose could this constitutional provision secure,
if a state might pass a law impairing the obligation of its own con-
tracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of right, to no controlling
judiciary power?" 9 This statement appears to be conclusive evidence
that, had Wilson had the opportunity presented to Marshall in the
early contract cases, Wilson would have construed the clause in pre-
cisely the same way, as would have most in his time.94 Far from re-
futing Marshall by recurring to Wilson, the critics appear to have
refuted themselves, since Wilson's statement in Chisholm is probably
the first mention of the contract clause from the federal Bench, and it
comes from one whose prestige at the Philadelphia Convention was
second to none, save perhaps Madison.
The argument from the civil law obligation of contracts is not
much better. In fact, it seems on the surface to be self-defeating.
Even if Wilson was the only Founder familiar with this tradition
(which seems implausible), how can one say that the Convention,
taken as a whole, could have "intended" such a meaning? This would
be to say that the Framers intended to adopt a reading of the clause of
which they could only have been dimly aware, in light of the paucity
of discussion that evidently took place regarding it there. It is not
clear that such a notion of intention is even comprehensible, let alone
sufficient as a basis for constitutional interpretation.
Finally, even a cursory reading of the development of the civil
law from ancient to modem times fails to support the notion of a civil
law obligation as put forward by Hill and Shirley. Apparently the
latter view is based upon a very narrow conception (or perhaps igno-
rance) of civil law development. In early Roman law, obligatio ex
contractu referred only to private debts, as we have seen; yet, accord-
ing to at least one prominent modem authority, the civil law obliga-
tion of contracts developed away from the strict Roman law
91. See, e.g., Isaacs, John Marshall on Contracts: A Study in Early American Juristic The-
ory, 7 VA. L. REV. 413 (1921); F. STITES, PUBLIC INTEREST AND PRIVATE GAIN: THE
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE, Ch. 9 (1972); see also W. HUNTING, supra note 18, at 48.
92. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
93. Id. at 465.
94. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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conception of obligation to a much broader notion which subsumed
the concept under natural law, a development which took place be-
tween the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries." Unless fundamental
principles of American constitutional law rest upon ancient prece-
dents, ignoring their subsequent development in light of relatively
more modem conditions, it would seem that the Hill-Shirley theory is
simply unfounded.
If one can say that the Founders were not cognizant of the devel-
opment of the civil law tradition, one certainly cannot say that they
were unfamiliar with the theory of contract in the common law.
What is important for this inquiry is that, while it may be true that
"quasi-contract" and "implied contract" are the same in the civil law
tradition, this is not the case in the common law.96 Whereas in the
former case, only "express" contracts give rise to "real" obligations;
in the latter, both "express" and "implied" contracts are obligatory.
This may explain why both Hill and Shirley place so much reliance on
the civil law theory; the only other possibilities are the common law,
in which case Marshall was right in saying that grants give rise to
implied executory agreements, or natural law, in which case Marshall
was right in saying that states are obligated by their contracts. Both
of these points Hill and Shirley must deny in order to make their
argument plausible.
The truth of the matter seems to be that the development of both
civil and common law contract doctrines between the thirteenth and
seventeenth centuries was in the direction of increasing acknowledge-
ment of autonomy (free will) as the basis for obligation.9" During
most of this period, however, absolutism prevented inclusion of the
"state" into the widening domain of responsibility. With the demise
of absolutist governments, government itself came to be seen increas-
ingly as a kind of "autonomous" entity capable of making contractual
agreements and being held accountable for them. This "Kantian" de-
velopment was retarded somewhat in Continental Europe, though not
completely so.9" In England, it took the form of the principle that the
Crown could not revoke its grants and charters. The fullest expres-
sion of the notion of autonomy was found in the United States in the
idea that even legislatures could not impair the obligations arising
from contracts they themselves had entered into.
95. A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF LAWS 580-84 (3rd ed. 1977). A similar view is taken by Hunting.
96. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 293 (5th ed. 1979).
97. A. VON MEHREN, supra note 95, at 578-79.
98. Id. at 586-88.
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As to the "origins-objects" argument, its ahistoricity seems evi-
dent. To hold that a public contract is one in which "public," as dis-
tinct from "private," purposes are manifest, is to presuppose a world
view which includes a sharp distinction between public interests and
private rights. But it is not likely that the Founders possessed such a
view of their world. Rather, it is more likely that they shared an opin-
ion "that society existed to preserve the rights an individual possessed
before he entered society and the corollary that society benefitted or
prospered in direct proportion to the protection afforded individual
rights." 99 According to Francis Stites:
Protection of the basic right, property, either of private individuals
or groups of private individuals would encourage the productive
labor necessary to open the continent and develop the economy.
Nineteenth-century American law absorbed this belief in the tie
between individual rights and public welfare.'O°
In short, if the Founders believed that construction of a legal and
political framework for protection of private rights best served the
public interest (recalling Madison's statement about the obligation
clause in Federalist No. 44), then no sharp distinction between public
and private contracts is possible. The Hill-Shirley view finds such a
distinction only because it assumes motives which could only be based
on feelings not widely shared in 1787, though they came to be widely
shared at a later time. Any argument that goes, then, from an "ob-
jects-origins" distinction to a "public-private" distinction simply begs
the question. No one predisposed to deny that the Founders intended
to distinguish public from private contracts would accept the idea
that they intended to distinguish contracts having a "public purpose"
from those that did not.
The argument drawn from the positive-law theory of obligation
fares no better, and for the same reason. The idea that a state cannot
contract with regard to its essential powers of sovereignty is closely
related to the idea that contracts embodying important public pur-
poses are subject to impairment by the state. For what are "essential
powers of sovereignty" if they are not those powers which may, at all
times and places, override private claims in the public interest? As
Nathan Isaacs has shown, however, the Framers were steeped in the
natural-law tradition of the eighteenth century, and one must read
Marshall's early contract decisions in that light.' Even professor
99. F. STITES, supra note 91, at 99.
100. Id. at 99-100.
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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Corwin, arguably not one of Marshall's greatest admirers, criticizes
those who would place the blame for all the social and economic ills
of the late nineteenth century on these decisions. 102 Indeed, we have
seen that Marshall himself laid some of the groundwork for the later
development of reserved state powers in the Willson and Providence
Bank decisions," 3 and this well before the revolution in nineteenth
century jurisprudence led by John Austin and his followers."
Nevertheless, Marshall's late nineteenth century critics insist
upon the Great Chief Justice's complicity (conscious or otherwise) in
a conservative scheme designed for "subordinating the public good to
the benefit of a privileged few."' 0 5 While Shirley's view is extreme,
Hill's view is more moderate; but Hill, in the following passage, leaves
little doubt as to where his concerns lie:
A legislature, in a fit of benevolence, inserts in the charter of a
charitable institution ... that it shall be exempt from taxation. A
great railway company wheedles . . .privileges,-perchance cou-
pled with a release from public burdens,-which enables it to hold
whole communities in a state of vassalage more galling and more
durable than any established by the feudal system; or it combines
with a ring of bad men, corrupts the judiciary, and plunders the
commercial capital of the country at pleasure. Or, to use a more
painful illustration, the perhaps most shamelessly corrupt and con-
temptible body of men that ever called themselves a legislature,
grant to a corporation . . .the exclusive monopoly . . .of killing
butchers' meat in a great city and its suburbs. To rescind the ex-
emption from taxation, when it proves burdensome to the State; to
attempt to limit the powers uncautiously granted to the railway
company, when shown to be mere instruments of oppression and
extortion; to repeal the monopoly of furnishing an essential article
of food, even to save two hundred thousand people from starva-
tion,-are not wise and beneficent acts of legislation, but laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts, breaches of public faith so
contrary to sound principles of government that they are classed
with ex post facto laws and bills of attainder! Chief Justice Mar-
102. E. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION Ch. 7 (1919).
103.. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
104. Austin's jurisprudence emphasized the primacy of positive law, the importance of leg-
islation as the main agency for articulating positive law, and a utilitarian foundation for legis-
lation derived from his friend and neighbor Bentham. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (1832 &
reprint 1954). Especially useful is the introductory essay by H.L.A. Hart in this volume, as
well as the bibliographic note and synopsis of lectures which follows Professor Hart's essay.
See J. AUSTIN, supra at pp. vii-xxxi.
105. Isaacs, supra note 91, at 165 (remarking on Shirley's book).
[Vol. 11:343
OBLIGATION CLAUSE
shall did not mean this; but his decision means this to the present
generation. 106
But apparently the Great Chief Justice did mean that! And so, it
seems, did the Founders. Madison, himself, made no clear-cut dis-
tinction between ex post facto laws and laws impairing the obligation
of contracts, as we have already seen. Be that as it may, one must
interpret the foregoing passage in light of the understanding of Hill's
role as an Assistant U.S. Attorney General during a period in which
the proportion of contract clause cases which resulted in holdings of
unconstitutionality reached an all-time high: the period between 1865
and 1873.107 It was during this period that state governments began
to suffer the consequences of ill-advised concessions granted to private
corporations prior to the Civil War, consequences which probably
seemed insufferable in its aftermath. In light of the ever-present
human temptation to blame the dead for the sins of the living, the
Hill-Shirley view is at least understandable, albeit incorrect.
Finally, it should be pointed out that full development of the
doctrine of "police" powers (as a qualification of the contract clause)
had not quite received its clearest formulation at the time Hill and
Shirley wrote the works we are now considering. This was to take
place in Stone v. Mississippi,1 8 just one year after the publication of
Shirley's work. This means that the critics of the 1870's were attack-
ing the contract clause doctrines of the Marshall Court, because of the
"unfittingness" of their application to the period in question, before
the Supreme Court had had time to develop a proper "fit." Underly-
ing this view is an idea that the judicial process embodies an essen-
tially legislative function, one which would be ever-ready to respond
to conflicting demands arising from changing circumstances, accord-
ing to perhaps novel conceptions of what is "just" or "prudent."
As to the argument that the Founders could not have intended
the conjunction of federal jurisdiction over state courts (Cohens) with
the principle that states were obligated by their contracts, little discus-
sion seems necessary. If the Framers had intended that federal courts
would exercise such jurisdiction, what could be its content if not such
specific provisions of the Constitution as the limitations set forth in
article I, section 10? On the other hand, if they had intended that
states should be obligated by their contracts, it is absurd to think that
they would then have sought to render such obligation nugatory
106. Hill, supra note 64, at 192.
107. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 93.
108. 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
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through deprivation of enforcement potential. Wilson's opinion in
Chisholm seems definitive on this point."°9
EFFECTS OF THE SHIFT
We have discovered the origin of the modern idea that the Foun-
ders intended a sharp distinction to be drawn between public and pri-
vate contracts in the writings of some relatively obscure authors
whose works appeared between the years 1874 and 1879. We have
likewise seen that these authors based this idea upon serious misinter-
pretations of early sources, serious misconceptions about the nature of
the judicial process, and an undisguised preoccupation with the ulti-
mate effects (some merely imagined) of the Marshall Court's early
obligation clause decisions.
As already noted, when viewed from the perspective of the late
nineteenth century reformers, such preoccupations are easily under-
stood. These critics were responding, in part, to the widespread eco-
nomic insecurity and consequent agitation for monetary reform
occasioned by the currency crises of the early 1870's, 1"0 and in part, to
the apparent eagerness of the Supreme Court to protect the fruits of
improvident legislative grants (made, for the most part, prior to the
Civil War) via the contract clause between 1865 and 1873.1'
At the same time, ideas respecting the nature of judicial decision-
making were changing. The Court's 1869 decision in Hepburn v. Gris-
wold, I" invalidating a federal law on contract clause grounds, had
given way to a dramatic reversal just two years later" 3 and had
caused many to question the traditionally accepted notion that judi-
cial decisions are based upon "findings" of the law. ' 14 Oliver Wendell
Holmes, in the early 1870's, had advanced an idea that the process of
judging was complex and that there was a sense in which judges had
"made" the law, as well as a sense in which they had "found" it. 15
Armed with much hostility toward the contemporaneous Supreme
Court and a new theory of judicial law-making rooted in an oversim-
109. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
110. See, e.g., L. GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT 15-18 (1978), for a brief but excel-
lent discussion of this situation.
111. B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 93.
112. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
113. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
114. See, e.g., C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT: 1862-1890
174 (1939).
115. 0. Holmes, Jr., The Gas Stoker's Strike, 7 AMER. L. REV. 583 (1873). See also M.
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA Ch. 8 (1957).
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plification of the Holmes idea, Hill, Shirley, and Hutchinson read
their own experience and theory into their commentaries on Marshall,
concluding that when Marshall's Court rendered its famous contract
decisions, it "made the law" in "activist" fashion.
1 16
As suggested before, the critics had their effect. In marked con-
trast with earlier periods, numerous statements reflecting the Hill-
Shirley-Hutchinson "private debts and obligations" view of the Mar-
shall Court's contract decisions appear after Cooley's apparent adop-
tion of the view in 1880.17 Between 1880 and 1938-the year in
which B.F. Wright published his influential book on the contract
clause, l18 treatises on the law of corporations,' 19 contracts, 1 20 and the
Constitution1 2 ' challenged Marshall's "public contracts" approach.
On the other hand, a number of authors continued to applaud Mar-
shall's approach.1 22 After 1938, however, the cheering stops, perhaps
116. See, e.g., J. SHIRLEY, supra note 72, at 400-10.
117. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 14.
119. 2 V. MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1005
(1882). Morawetz challenges the Dartmouth decision, thinking it difficult to support the the-
ory that a charter of incorporation is a contract.
120. 2 C. BEACH, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 2116 at n.1
(1896) (introduction of the clause was due to the financial condition of the country and the
repudiation of private debts). 6 W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 6295 (1905) (clause was
introduced "to prevent states from passing laws repudiating private debts"). 3 W. ELLIOTr,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 875 (1913) (the "purpose of the provision, no
doubt, was to correct a practice that had been quite prevalent in some of the states after the
revolution and before the adoption of the [C]onstitution"). This is a rather puzzling statement,
in view of the fact that Elliott nowhere says what the "practice" was, but it nonetheless sug-
gests a narrow interpretation of the Framers' intentions respecting the contract clause.
121. C. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 575 (1886). Tiedeman here refers to Clement Hill's argument as "ingenious,"
interpreting Hill's position to be that we must look to the Roman or civil law phrase obligatio
ex contractu for the true meaning of the clause. C. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 54 (1890) ("if the intention of the framers of the Constitution is
to furnish the true [rule of] construction, we must conclude that nothing would be included
within the operation of this prohibition but debts and [the] other obligations issuing out of
contracts"). See also 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS OF JOHN MARSHALL 346-50 (J.
Cotton ed., 1911). Cotton is highly critical of Marshall's early decisions, especially
Dartmouth, accusing the Chief Justice of personal bias in holding that a charter of incorpora-
tion was a contract. E. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION Ch. 6 (1919).
Corwin thinks that Marshall should have made a distinction between public and private con-
tracts, but that he didn't because it would have been insulting to the states, since to have made
such a distinction would have been to declare that state contracts carried a lesser obligation
than contracts between individuals. See also 1 G. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 240-41 (1893); 2 G. BANCROFT,
HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
137-39 (1893); see also E. ERICKSON & D. ROWE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
346-49 (1933).
122. 1 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 3-5 (1920). Williston discusses the differ-
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in testament to the influence of Professor Wright's book. 123 Only re-
cently can one clearly discern movement toward refurbishing Mar-
shall's reputation in this area. 124
More significantly, the Marshall critics, who had launched a ma-
jor historiographical assault upon the early Supreme Court, set the
stage for subsequent criticism of that Court which erupted in the
1890's on the heels of the Court's famous decision in the Income Tax
Case.'25 When the Fuller Court invalidated the federal tax in Pollock,
supporters of the tax attacked the very principle of judicial review,
claiming that Marshall had "usurped" legislative authority in Mar-
bury v. Madison.26 Though from a strictly technical standpoint, the
ence between "implied contracts" and "quasi-contracts," asserting that they are not the same
thing. Recall that the argument against Marshall based upon the civil law interpretation of the
contract clause presumes that there is no distinction between these. W. HUNTING, THE OBLI-
GATION OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Ch. 5 (1919).
Hunting makes a puzzling assertion on the last page of his book to the effect that there is not
reason to believe that the Founders meant the clause to cover anything more than private
contracts. In view of the facts (1) that Hunting's entire work is devoted to vindication of the
Marshall Court's early contract decisions, and (2) that the final chapter of the book is devoted
to showing that the exact intention of the Framers is not clear, the only reasonable way to
interpret Hunting's final assertion is to say that he must have had Story's notion of the Foun-
ders' motive in mind-that what was immediately present to their minds (pressing financial
difficulties, etc.) did not necessarily circumscribe their intentions. See also T. NORTON, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 91-93 (1930); H. LYON, THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE MEN WHO MADE IT 195-98 (1936).
123. E. CORWIN & J. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 86-87 (1958).
Corwin and Peltason here state that "[T]he framers, when they spoke of 'contracts' whose
obligations could not be impaired by state law, had in mind the ordinary contracts between
individuals, especially contracts of debt. However, the meaning of the word was early ex-
panded by judicial interpretation to include contracts made by the states themselves, including
franchises granted to corporations." This is a very clear statement, in a very influential book,
of the modem version of the Framers' intentions and the Marshall Court's decisions-yet a
view which apparently did not exist prior to the 1870's. See also A. KELLEY AND W.
HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 275-76 (4th ed., 1970). Kelley and Harbison
think that the principal objective of the Founders was to prevent stay and tender laws. See also
JOHN MARSHALL: MAJOR OPINIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS 119, 121 (J. Roche ed., 1967).
Roche says that the Fletcher decision is "eccentric," and that there "is no evidence to support
the proposition that the Founders had intended to subsume land grants under the contract
clause." Roche also specifically accepts Shirley's version of the Dartmouth decision. G. GAR-
VEY, CONSTITUTIONAL BRICOLAGE 76 (1971), asserts that Marshall "elevated" property into
a sacred right. The major exception to these views is found in 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES Ch. 12 (1953). Crosskey is generally supportive
of the Marshall Court's doctrines in both the areas of contract and commerce.
124. See W. Mendelson, supra note 3; see also C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL
REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW Ch. 2 (1986).
Referring to the Mendelson article, Wolfe suggests that the latter makes a "stronger defense of
Marshall's contract clause cases," than he (Wolfe) would attempt but that he finds it nonethe-
less "persuasive." C. WOLFE, supra, at 360.
125. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
126. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a lengthy list of references to those making this
OBLIGATION CLAUSE
Marshall Court's contract decisions have little to do with Marbury or
any of its holdings; the assertion that Marshall "read" public con-
tracts "into" article 1, section 10, in order to lay a foundation for legal
protection of property rights, is of the same form as the later assertion
that Marshall read the idea of judicial review into the Constitution in
order to bring co-equal branches of government under judicial con-
trol. The idea was to pin the "activist" label on Marshall. That the
effort was successful is reflected little more than a decade later, when
the alleged pro-property activism of Marshall and the Federalist party
is made the basis for a conspiracy theory of the Constitution of the
United States. 
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claim, see R. Clinton, Eakin v. Raub. Refutation or Justification of Marbury v. Madison, 4
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 81-92, nn.50-51 (1987).
127. See, e.g., J. SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (Strout ed., 1967).
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